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JURISDICTION OE COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0) (2001).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following rules and statutes are determinative or of central importance to this
appeal:
1. Utah Real Estate Brokers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 et seep (2005), a
copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A.
2. Utah Statute of Erauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (2004) , a copy of which
is attached hereto as Appendix B.
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 56, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE.
The claims of plaintiff, Ira Sachs ("Sachs"), are based entirely on an alleged oral
finder's fee agreement for purportedly locating a purchaser for the United Park City
Mines Company ("UPCM'1), whose sole business was the leasing, development, and sale
of its 8,300 acres of real property. Sachs tried to interject himself into the sale of UPCM,
and now seeks in excess of two million dollars for making a few telephone calls in which
he did nothing more than tell Gerald Jackson ("Jackson") (who helped form Capital
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Growth Partners ("COP"), which eventually purchased UPCM) something that Jackson,
and everyone else who follows real estate in Park City, already knew.
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT
COURT.
On March 31, 2005, defendants, Joseph S. Lesser ("Lesser") and Eoeb Investors
Co. XL ("Eoeb"), filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Sachs' claims
on the grounds that: (1) no express or implied finder's fee agreement was ever made; (2)
Sachs' claims were barred because he did not have a real estate license; (3) Sachs' claims
were barred by the Statute of Frauds; and (4) Sachs failed to state a claim for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations. On April 8, 2005, UPCM filed a
motion for summary judgment on the same grounds.
Following oral argument on December 12, 2005, the district court issued a minute
entry decision on February 6, 2006, granting defendants' motions for summary judgment
in their entirety. In its minute entry ruling, the district coart first held that the undisputed
material facts demonstrated that no enforceable express or implied finder's fee agreement
was ever entered into because: (1) no reasonable minds could differ that there was no
meeting of the minds or mutual assent on the material terms of the alleged oral finder's
fee agreement; (2) there was a lack of defimtcness and material terms such as price, and
no reasonable method to calculate price, manifesting an intent of the parties to be bound
thereby; and (3) any finder's fee agreement was subject to further negotiation.
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Second, the district court held that Sachs' claims arc barred by the L'tah real estate
licensing statutes. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 et seq. (2005) (the "Act"), as a matter of law
because: ( 1) it is undisputed that Sachs did not have a real estate license: (2) I'PCM's
principal business was the leasing, development and sale of real property; (3) UPCM's
onlv asset of significance was its real property; and |4) Utah law requires a real estate
license to recover a finder's fee in connection with the sale of ~Lreal estate" which, by
statutor\ definition, includes "business opportunities involving real estate."
Third, the district court ruled that Sachs' contract and quantum meruit claims are
barred by the l'tah Statute ol frauds as a matter of law because: (1 ) it is undisputed that
the alleged finder's fee agreement relates to the sale or purchase of real estate as the only
significant asset owned by UPCM: (2) it is undisputed that no writing exists that would
satisfy the requirements of the l;tah Statute of Frauds; and (3) quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment claims cannot rescue claims otherwise precluded by the Utah Statute of
Frauds.
On February 15, 2006. the district court entered a final judgment dismissing all of
Sachs' claims with prejudice. The district court had previously granted UCiP's motion for
The district court also ruled that Sachs' claim for intentional interference
with prospective and economic relations fails as a matter of law. However. Sachs does
not appeal that ruling.
summary judgment and dismissed all of Sachs' claims against C(iP with prejudice on
September 13, 2005. Sachs filed his notice of appeal on March 16, 2006.
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS2
1. Sachs is a resident of Park City, Utah, and was a shareholder of UPCM at
all relevant times. (R. at 2, 1 1 14, 1141.)
2. Eoeb is a New York partnership with its principal place of business in New
York. New- York. (R. at 2, 1114.) At all relevant times, Eoeb owned a controlling
interest in UPCM. (R.at4, 1114.)
3. Lesser is the managing partner of Eoeb. Lesser is the former chairman of
UPCMs Board of Directors. (R. at 2, 11 14.)
4. UPCM is a Delaware corporation whose ''principal business ... is the
leasing, development and sale of real property located in or near Park City, Utah." (R. at
2-3, 11 14-15.)
5. UPCM owns the surface estate to more than 8,300 acres of land, of which
approximately 5.300 acres are leased to Deer Valley and the Park City Mountain Resort
for skiing and related purposes. (R. at 3, 1115.) 'Lhis real property is UPC.XEs ''only
asset of any significance whatsoever." (R.at 1210, 1257 )
2 Many of Sachs1 purported facts are not supported by his citations to the
record, are not made on personal knowledge, are inadmissible, and contradict Sachs1 own
deposition testimony.
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6. In or around 1999, UPCM attempted to develop a real estate project known
as the Flagstaff Mountain Resort Project, which incorporated another real estate
development project known as the Bonanza Mountain Resort Project (collectively the
"Projects"). (R. at 3-4, 1115, 1210.)
7. In July 1999, UPCM entered into a letter of understanding with DMB
Associates. Inc. ("DMB") to form a joint venture to develop the Projects. (R. at 4. 1210.)
8. The joint venture between UPCM and DMB was dissolved in December
2000 because, among other things, the parties could not agree on a business plan. (R. at
4. 1115. 1165-66, 1211.)
9. In late December 2000 or early January 2001, Hank Rothwell f'Rothweir),
UPCM's president, had discussions with Jackson, his friend and former business
associate, about the possibility of purchasing UPCM themselves. (R. at 1211, 1258-59.)
10. Approximately two weeks after their initial discussions. Rothwell told
Jackson he was not interested in purchasing UPCM but that Jackson should "go ahead
[and] take a run at it." (R. at 1211, 1258-59.)
11. In early 2001, an article appeared in the Park Record newspaper that
discussed the dissolution of the joint venture between UPCM and DMB. (R. at 5. 1211,
1255.)
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12. Jackson testified that after publication of this article, it "was public
mfonnalion that [UPCM] was in play [and] publically [sic] for sale." (R. at 1213, 1255.)
13. Sachs understood from reading the newspaper article that "it was apparent
that someone would come in and pick up the ball" from DMB. (R. at 1211, 1267.)
14. Upon learning that the DMB joint venture had dissolved, Sachs contacted
Rothwell because Sachs thought the Granite Land Company ("Granite"), which had an
established business relationship with Sachs, would be a "natural partner" with UPCM in
a joint venture to develop the Projects. (R. at 5, 1116, 1211.)
15. In March 2001, Sachs arranged a meeting between UPCM and Granite to
discuss a potential joint venture. (R. at 1116, 1144, 1211.)
16. At the time he arranged the meeting, Sachs understood, based on his
conversations with Rothwell, that UPCM was "interested in selling . . . all or part of
[UPCM]" and that UPCM was "hopeful that Granite might purchase all or part of it."
(R. at 1212, 1264, 1266-67.)
17. Prior to the meeting, Sachs informed Granite's principals that this was "an
opportunity to buy into or all of [UPCM]." (R. at 121 2, : 264.)
18. During the March meeting, UPCM, Granite and Sachs discussed both an
"acquisition" and a "joint venture." (R. at 1212, 1266.) Granite proposed ajoint venture
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wherein Granite would construct improvements to UPCM's real property without
providing an)' up-front cash to I 'PCM for the joint venture. (R. at 1116.)
19. Sachs testified that during the meeting, a finder's fee was never discussed:
Q. Okay. But as I understand your testimony, you had no
express communications with Mr. Rothwell about receiving a
finder's fee during the meeting you had with Granite.
A. That's correct.
Q. All right, but my question to you is, there was no discussion
of a finder's fee between you and Mr. Rothwell during the
meeting with Granite.
A. It would have been inappropriate. Customs and procedures
are that vou don't involve the purchaser m a conversation like
that.
(R. at 1116, 1145-46.)
20. In fact, Sachs admits he never had an> direct discussions with Rothwell or
anyone else at UPCM about his purported interest in getting paid a finder's fee by UPCM
in connection with a possible transaction with Granite. (R. at 1213. 12"". 12S0-S1.I
21. Subsequently, Marne Obernauer ("Obernauer"), a business associate ot
Lesser, called Lesser, pursuant to Sachs' request, to arrange a lunch meeting between
Sachs and Lesser in New York. (R. at 5. 1116. 1 171-72, 1175-76, 2048.)
22. Lesser agreed to meet with Sachs in New York in early Mav 2'K)E (Id.)
—|. , . -^ o - „p; - q -- -- ^ 1
23. During his call to Lesser. Obernauer mentioned something about Granite,
but did not know any details about the company. (R. at 1117, 1176-77.)
24. Lesser requested that Obernauerprovide information about (iranite prior to
his meeting with Sachs, (hi)
25. Sachs arranged for a written brochure about Granite to be sent to
Obernauer. 'Lhe brochure reflected that (iranite had experience in the construction of.
among other things, airports and bridges. (R. at 11 17, 1177, 1104.)
26. Obernauer sent Lesser the (iranite brochure prior to Lessor's meeting with
Sachs. <R. at 1117, 1 177.)
27. On May 2, 2001. Sachs, Obernauer, ami Lesser met for lunch in New York
City. (R.at5. 1117. 1150, 1177, 1212.)
28. Sachs testified that during the lunch, Sachs and I.esser "talked extensively
about (iranite" and a potential joint venture between (iranite ami I 'PCM. (R. at 1117,
1181, 1212, 1260.)
20. Sachs testified that he did not ask Lesser if UPCM '"was in negotiations
with anyone else," nor did he discuss with Lesser "any other potential buyer [or] joint
venture partner by name." (R. at 1212, 1269.)
30. Instead, the sole purpose of the lunch meeting was to determine whether
Granite would be a potential joint venturer with UPCM. (R. at 2042, 2098-00.)
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3 1. Sachs admitted that he and Lesser did not discuss a finder's fee during the
lunch:
(,). Okay. All right. What if anything, was said during the early
Mav 2001 luncheon about a tinder's fee?
A. Nothing.
Q. Nothing at all?
A. Nothing.
(R. at 28. 1 117-18, 1153, 1213.)
32. According to Sachs' own testimony, the only ' non-eommonly known
information" that Sachs learned during the lunch was that Eoeb. the controlling
shareholder of UPCM, was allegedly dissatisfied with Rothwell and puiportedh' felt that
the "sooner they got (UPCM] sold, the better it was." Sachs did not view this
information as "confidential" information. (R. at 1212-1213. 1273.)
33. On May 17, 2001, upon the advice of his attorney, Sachs sent a letter to
Rothwell stating as follows:
I am delighted that my introducing I 'nited Park
City Mines to (iranite Land Company appears to be
heading in the right direction and I am pleased that the
confidentiality letter has been signed. I certainly will
continue to do everything in my power to bring
together a mutually satisfactory agreement between
these two parties. I took the opportunity to express
this commitment to vour chairman. Joe Lessor [sic].
when he united me to lunch at the Sky 8 Room in
New York in early May.
I perceive this venture as joining two entities
with the potential of creating one of the nation's
premier skiing and real estate developments. In other
words. I thmk that both parties are in the right place at
the right time. I hope you agree.
In that lunch with Joe Lessor (sic], I was
delighted to find that he seems to share our enthusiasm
for this joint \ enture. I hope that this feeling is
generally shared by the rest of your beard. Most
potential JV land development partners would still
require Granite Construction to do the development
infrastructure. This JV partner comes with that
compatibility. Joe gave me his encouragement to "get
the job done."
I write this letter to remind you that I will
expect a modest finder's fee if an agreement comes to
fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime
developed lots in the new project, or some other
consideration acceptable to both of us. While I believe
that we have an understanding as to this finder's fee. I
do think that matters of this sort ought to be out on the
table early on, and I hope that you feel the same.
Please let me know if you have any questions
about such a finder's lee.
I look forward to continuing our quest it) link
these two parties for everyone's benefit, including the
shareholders who overwhelming [sic] expressed their
approval.
R. at HIS, 1 105, 12 33.
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34. Sachs testified that he did not ha\ e anything specifically in mind with
respect to the "consideration acceptable to both of us/' Rather, he was trying "to draw
[Rothw-elll out to come up with something." (R. at 1075, 2054-55. 2127.)
35. Sachs never discussed the specific amount of a finder's fee with Lesser,
Rothwell or anyone affiliated with I PCM. (R. at 6, 1213.)
30. Sachs claims that on May IS. 2001. after receiving Sachs' letter of May 1
2001. Lesser called Sachs and stated that he was no longer interested in a joint venture
and that he wanted UPCM sold. (R. at 1110. 1155-56.)
37. On May 18, 2001, Sachs wrote a letter to Rothwell stating:
I understand, after a conversation yesterday
with Lessor [sic], that his preference would be to sell
the company rather than enter into a joint venture. I
had referred to a joint \enture in yesterday's letter
because I had understood that you would consider such
a proposition iand that is ob\ iously what (.iranite
seeks), and because a joint venture purchaser might
also work for everyone.
Ilappilv. if your company's preference is sale
[sic]. Granite, as I suggested in yesterday's letter, is
still an excellent prospect. Another imestor. together
with Granite, would make an excellent purchaser. I
am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such a
joint venture purchaser.
(R. at 1110. 1 106.)
38. Rothwell never responded to Sachs' letters of May 17 and IS. 2001. (R. at
1214, 1277.)
30. The contemplated agreement with (iranite referenced in Sachs' letters oi
Mav 17 and IS, 2001, never came to fruition because Granite never entered into a joint
venture with or purchased UPCM. (R. at 1120, 1102, 1214, 1277.)
40. Sachs admits that neither Lesser nor anyone else affiliated with Eoeb ever
told Sachs that Sachs would be paid a finder's fee for fincing a buyer.
Q. Did Mr. Lesser ever say to you, Ira, go find me a buyer and
Ell pay you a fee?
A. No.
(,). Did anyone other than Mr. Lesser affiliated with Eoeb
Investors, as that phrase is used in Paragraph 15, ever say to
you, Ira, go find a buyer for I tailed Park City Mines and
you'll get paid a fee?
A. You mean Eoeb Investors or -
Q. Yes.
A. No.
(R. at 1110. 1157.)
41. On June 2, 200 L an article appeared in the Park Record entitled "Merger
Rumblings Heard at UPCM." The article stated that I PCM "was exploring strategies to
raise money in order to fund the construction of Ekmstaff Mountain Research and
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Bonanza Mountain Resort." including "a sale or exchange of UPUM's capital stock.
assets, projects or business to one or more parties . . . ." (R. at 1214, 1267. 12S5.)
42. Sachs first contacted Jackson regarding UPCM the same week the article
appeared m lhe Park Record. (R. at A 1214. 12AU)
43. When Sachs contacted Jackson. Jackson already knew that UPCM was for
sale through discussions he had had with Rothwell. his long-time friend, and through the
newspaper articles in the Park Record. (R. at 1120. 1169, 1198. 1214.1 Jackson testified
as follows:
Q. During your first conversation with Mr. Sachs. I want
\ou to tell me to the best of \our recollection exactly what he
told you and exactly what you told him.
THE WITNESS: I believe you're referring to the
conversation that we think took place in May or June of 2001.
Mr. Sachs called me and recommeiuled-I think he sank why
don't you buy the mining company, or something like that.
And I said, Em already looking at it.
And he said, do you need any money?
And I said no.
And he said. well. Granite guys would be very interested in
doing the site work and putting some money into the
transaction. Why don't you call them. And he gave me the
phone number and I agreed to call him.
(,). Do you recall anything else about that first
conversation with Mr. Sachs?
A. Yeah. I was \ cry uncomfortable discussing the deal at
all, but again, I didn't want to he rude, and I-that's -thai was
all I told him. It was probably said, as I saio to everyone, it's
a public company, 1can't discuss it. That point was made
very early to me and I took it to heart.
(R. at 1970, 2051, 2144.)
44. The only new information Sachs relayed to Jackson was that Sachs had had
lunch with Lesser in early May 2001 and that the sooner UPCM was sold, the better.
(R. at 1214. 1215. 1256. 2052.)
45. On June 4, 2001, Sachs sent Jackson a facsimile covershcet regarding "JY
(iranite Const" requesting that Jackson call Sachs "after \our talk with Ilank Rothwell."
(R. at 1215. 12S7.)
46. Sachs continued to contact Jackson regarding Jackson's contemplated
purchase of UPCM. (R. at 9, 1120.)
47. Jackson merely gave Sachs the courtesy of returning his calls. Jackson
testified that "Sachs called ... so many times that it was a nuisance (but IJ was not going
to share any information wath him." In fact, Jackson viewed Sachs as an outsider to the
entire transaction. (R. at 2056-57, 2138-39.)
48. On Eebruary 21, 2002, CGP. a new company that Jackson helped form,
formally offered to purchase UPCM for approximately SSI .3 million. (R. at 11, 1215.)
49. On February 23. 2002, the Salt Lake Tribune published an article regarding
CGP's proposed purchase of UPCM. (R. at 1215. 1279, 12SS.)
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50. Sachs never attended any meetings between UPCM and Jackson, was never
asked to sign a confidentiality agreement with UPCM and never participated in any
negotiations with UPCM. In fact, Sachs learned of CGP's agreement to purchase UPCM
like the rest of the world, through a newspaper article. (R. at 1977, 2021-22.)
51. The day after the article appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, Sachs sent a fax
to Rothwell regarding "completion of task." This was the first time Sachs notified
UPCM that he considered Jackson to be his "client." (R. at 1215. 1279, 1289.)
52. According to Sachs, between June 2001 and February 2002, the ''only"
thing Sachs did to find a purchaser for UPCM "was make periodic telephone calls" to
Jackson. (R. at 1215, 1279.)
53. On or about June 16, 2003, UPCM and CGP completed a revised merger
whereby UPCM became a wholly owned subsidiary of CGP. CGP paid approximately
S67.2 million for UPCM's shares. (R. at 14. 1215.)
54. After the closing of the transaction. Sachs repeatedly "accosted" Jackson at
restaurants in Park City to discuss his claim for a finder's fee. In an attempt to be polite
and not cause a scene, Jackson responded to Sachs' statement that he had an
"arrangement" with Cesser by stating "good for [you]." Jackson also told Sachs that
"that's between you and Lesser" and that he "didn't mind" if Lesser paid him a fee. (R.
at 1978,2023,2060.)
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55. On August 19, 2003, Rothwell sent Sachs a facsimile stating that:
Ira-United Park does not agree with your agency argument.
Gerry [Jackson] and I had discussed UP for years! We
viewed you as a representative of Granite Construction only!
(R. at 1452, 2062.)3
56. According to Sachs, Sachs spent no more than ten hours total attempting to
find a buyer for UPCM. (R. at 1121, 1159.)
57. Sachs did not forgo any business opportunities by allegedly attempting to
locate a purchaser for UPCM. (R. at 1121, 1159.)
58. Sachs did not have a Utah real estate license at any relevant time. Sachs7
real estate license in New York lapsed at least 15 to 20 years ago. (R. at 1121, 1162.)
3 Sachs' assertion that Rothwell failed to disclose under oath in the
Pennsylvania Avenue Partners v. United Park City Mines case that he only knew Jackson
socially is highly misleading. Rothwell actually testified as follows:
Q: Do you know [Jackson] in any other capacity other
than a- do you know him in a capacity other than a
professional capacity in relation to this Capital Growth?
A. We-Em-Evc known [Jackson] for a long time socially.
It's a small town. I see him at social functions.
(Emphasis added.)
Rothwell reasonably understood the question to be whether he knew Jackson other than
professionally. As Rothwell pointed out in his deposition in this case, he was not asked if
he had any prior business dealings with Jackson. (R. at 1981, 2013, 2014.)
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59. Sachs has never received a tinder's fee for the sale of a company. (R. at
1970,2005-07.2045.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Sachs' claims are based entirely upon an alleged oral finder's fee agreement for
supposedly locating a purchaser for UPCM. By his complaint, Sachs seeks a three
percent (3%) commission of UPCM's S67.2 million sale price. The Court should affirm
the district court's order granting defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing
Sachs' claims with prejudice because the undisputed evidence shows that Sachs' claims
fail as a matter of law.
First. Sachs was not licensed to sell real estate at any relevant time. The principal
business of UPCM was the leasing, development, and sale of real property located in or
near Park City, Utah, and said real property was UPCM's only asset of any significance.
Utah's real estate licensing statutes specifically preclude the recovery of compensation
for finding a buyer of a business whose assets consist of real estate, Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-2-2(14) ("real estate' includes business opportunities involving real estate").
Second, the alleged finder's fee agreement was not in writing. Therefore, Sachs'
claims also are barred by the Utah Statute of frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 ("e\ery
agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation" must be in writing). Sachs' attempt to circumvent the Statute of Frauds
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by asserting claims for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment and partial performance are
also unavailing. Utah courts have consistently held that a person seeking to recover a
commission relating to the sale of real property may only recover by contract, not by
quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. Watson v. Odell, 198 P. 772 (Utah 1921).
Likewise, Utah courts have long held that "partial performance" is inapplicable to such
actions and will not save an agreement that otherwise fails under the Statute of Frauds.
Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640 (1920).
Finally, the alleged oral finder's fee agreement was never made. By Sachs1 own
admission, defendants rever promised to pay Sachs a finder's fee for locating a purchaser
for UPCM. The alleged oral finder's fee agreement is not sufficiently definite or certain
to demonstrate a meeting of the minds between Sachs and the defendants with respect to
the material terms, including the amount of compensation. Moreover, at all relevant
times, Sachs claimed to represent Granite, which never purchased UPCM. Sachs did not
"find" a purchaser for UPCM. Jackson knew that UPCM was for sale well before Sachs
approached him. In fact, when Sachs first approached Jackson, the sale of UPCM was a
matter of public record. Sachs did not provide any information to Jackson regarding
UPCM that he did not already know. Accordingly, Sachs provided no benefit to
defendants and neither an express nor implied contract was made. In short, Sachs' claims
fail as a matter of law and the district court's judgment must be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED SACHS* CLAIMS
BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A REAL ESTATE LICENSE.
In I 'tali, it is unlawful "for any person to engage in the business, act in the
capacity of advertise, or assume to act as a principal real estate broker, associate real
estate broker, or a real estate sales agent within this state without a license." Utah Code
Ann. ^ 61-2-1. Consequenth', a person may not bring or maintain an action in any court
of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation lor any services
which are only authorized to be performed by a licensed principal real estate broker.
Utah Code Ann. $ 61~2U1S(1 U
A "principal real estate broker" includes any person "who, with the expectation o\'
receiving \ aluablc consideration, assists or directs in the procurement of prospects for the
negotiation of" the sale of "real estate." Id $ 61-2-2( 12)(d) (emphasis added): see also
Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc., 584 P.2d 848. 852 (Utah
UPS) (holding $ 61-2-2 applies to tinder's agreements); Andalex Resources v. Myers,
4 "lhe full text of t tab Code Ann. ^ 61-2-18(1) provides:
No person may bring or maintain an action in any court ol this state
for the recovery of a commission, fee. or compensation for any act done or
service rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to other than
licensed principal brokers, unless the person was duly licensed as a
principal broker at the time of the doing of the act or rendering the service.
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871 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("The act of finding or locating a prospective
buyer falls within the reach of the broker licensing statutes.''). "Real estate"' includes
"leaseholds and business opportunities involving real property." Utah Code Ann
$ 61 -2-2( 14) (emphasis added). This expansi\ e de Unit ion reflects the legislature's
intention that the real estate licensing provisions be given broad application. Chade v.
Morgan,1) Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019. 1021 ( 1959) r[T]he legislature saw fit to include
within the definition of the term 'real estate' leaseholds and other interests less than
leaseholds. This clearly indicates the intention of the legislature that a broad coverage be
given to the term "real estate1 for the purposes of the Act.").
Thus, the language of the I ;tah real estate licensing statutes provides that (1) if a
party brings an action in a Utah court, (2) for compensation, (3) for acts resulting in the
sale or exchange of real estate, (4) he or she must have the requisite broker license in
order to recover the fee. Anadalcx, 871 at 1045 (citing Utah Code Ann. ^§ 61-2-4. 61-2-
18 (1993)).
The majority rule in jurisdictions with similar real estate licensing statutes is that if
a sale of an ongoing business contains any real estate component, no matter how de
minimus, an unlicensed broker will be denied any commission. See Blackthorne Group.
Inc. v. Pines ofNewmarket, Inc., 848 A.2d 725, 731 (N.H. 2004): Chapin v. Ncuhoff
Broadcasting-Grand Island, 684 NAY.2d 588. 593 (Neb. 2004): GDC Environmental
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Sen-ices, Lnc. v. Ransbottom Landfill. 740 N.E.2d 1254. 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000): Leiff
v. Medco Professional Services, 973 P.2d 1276. 127S (Co. Ct. App. 1998): Lockridge v.
Hale, 764 SAY.2d 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Ford v. American Medical Intern, Inc., 422
NAY.2d 67 (Neb. 1988); Knight v. Johnson. 741 S.\Y.2d 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987);
Bcrchenko v. Fulton Federal Savings & Loan Ass.. 261 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. 1979): Thomas
v. Jan-is. 518 P.2d 532 (Kan. 1974); Brakhage v. Georgetown Associates, Lnc, 523 P.2d
145, 147 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Bonasera v. Roffe. 442 P.2d 165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968);
Folsom v. Fallen, 131 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1953); Doran v. Lmeson Aviation, Inc.,
419 F.Supp. 586 (D. Wyo. 1976).5
In Blackthorne, for example, the plaintiff attempted to recover a commission for
the sale of an assisted living facility business with assets consisting of, among other
things, real property. 848 A.2d at 727. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to
The minority rule is that an unlicensed plaintiff will not be precluded from
potentially recovering a commission if the real estate component is "merely incidental" to
the sale of the entire business, i.e.. real estate was not a significant asset of the company
or a motivating factor for the sale. GDC Environmental, 740 N.H.2d at 1258 (adopting
maioritv rule, but noting that a minority of "jurisdictions hold that an unlicensed broker is
not precluded from recovering a commission if the real estate component is 'merely
incidental' to the sale of the entire business"); Thomas v. Daubs, 684 N.E.2d 1011, 1015
(111. Ct. App. 1997) (adopting rule permitting "unlicensed broker to collect his fee only
when the real estate is incidental to the transaction"'); March Group, Inc. v. Bellar, 908
SAY.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) ("YYhere the sale of a business involves only a
transfer of stock, the real estate owned by the corporation should be viewed as incidental
to the sale unless it is the business1 principal asset.").
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state a claim because the plaintiffdid not. have a license to sell real estate. Id. at 728. On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to a finder's fee because the company's
real estate was only "incidental" to the sale of the business and because the defendant
was a sophisticated business entity that the statute was no": meant to protect. Id. at 730.
In affirming the trial court's dismissal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that:
More importantly, the Act expressly defines "real
estate" to include "business opportunities which involve any
interest in real estate." [Citation omitted.] The use of the
word "any" means that the Act applies regardless of whether
real estate is "incidental" to the transaction. The Act thus
applies to the brokering of business opportunities involving
real estate, no matter how de minimus the real estate interest.
As the sale of the defendant's business undisputably
involved real estate, the Act applied to the sale, even if, as the
plaintiff contends, its dominant purpose was not the sale of
real estate. Applying the Act to the sale of the business is
consistent with the Act's purpose, which is to protect the
"public" from unscrupulous real estate brokers, [citation
omitted.J The plain language of the Act refutes the plaintiffs
assertion that the Act was intended to protect only
unsuspecting homebuyers, to the exclusion of sophisticated
business entities. [Citation omitted.]
Similarly, in Doran, the plaintiffwas employed to find a buyer for the defendant's
business, with assets consisting of leases, buildings, fuel storage, and equipment. 419 P.
Supp. at 587. Applying Wyoming law, the trial court found that because "the assets of
[the business] which were to be sold included leases . . . , real estate was involved." Id. at
588. As a result, the plaintiffs "activities in producing a purchaser for [the business]
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constituted] sufficient grounds for holding that he was acting as a real estate broker." LI.
at 587.
Finally, in Leiff the plaintiff brought an action to recover a commission pursuant
to a contract for the sale of a business. 973 P.2d at 1280. The business' assets included a
lease. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment holding that the real estate licensing
laws required dismissal of the plaintiffs claims. Id On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the real estate licensing requirements did not apply because the lease was not transferred
as part of the sale of the business. Id. Rather, the business' entire stock was sold. Id. In
rejecting the plaintiffs argument, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded as follows:
We conclude that there is no requirement that real estate or a
leasehold be transferred from one legal entity to another to
trigger the licensure requirements. Rather, where, as here, the
corporation whose entire stock is sold holds a leasehold that
becomes the buyer's leasehold as a result of the sale, whether
bv transfer from the seller or otherwise, an indirect change in
a leasehold interest, and therefore, the licensure requirements
apply.
Id. at 1278.
Mere, as m the cases cited above, it is undisputed that l.'PCM's only asset of any
sienificance is its real estate and that its principal business is the leasing, development,
and sale of real property. Therefore, under the application of either the minority or
majority rule, the sale of L'PCM constituted a "business opportunity involving real
estate" which required Sachs to have a real estate license under I "tab law. Because it is
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undisputed that Sachs did not ha\e a license at any relevant time, his claims were
properly dismissed.
Sachs argues that his claims are not barred by the Act because: (1i the Act is a
penal statute and must be strictly construed; (2) the merger of l.'PCM was structured as a
stock sale rather than an asset purchase; (3) Sachs' offer to accept a finder's fee in the
form of prime developed lots did not require him to be licensed under the Act; (4) he is
exempt from the Act; and (5) the purpose of the Act is not offended by enforcing the
alleged finder's fee agreement. Faeh of these arguments is without merit.
A. The Utah Real Kstate Brokers Act Is Not Penal and Should Be Broadly
Construed.
Sachs' contention that the Act is penal and should be strict!) construed is
meritless. If the purpose of a statute is not to punish but to accomplish some other
legitimate governmental purpose, the statute is considered non-penal. Viking Pools, Inc.
v. Malonev, 770 P.2d 732. 735 (Cal. 1999).
Here, the purpose of the Act is to protect members of the public who rely on
licensed real estate brokers and salesmen to perform tasks that require a high degree ol
honcstv and integrity. Global Ri'crcation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d
155, 158 (Ctah 1980); Anderson v. Johnson, 108 l'tah 4.7, 160 P.2d 725 (1945). The
licensing requirements and the provisions designed to enforce compliance therewith are
designed to assure such honesty and integrity. Id. Because the purpose of the Act is to
OMWEST36382370 v1 24
accomplish a legitimate government purpose, rather than to punish, it is non-penal and
not to be narrowly construed. Sachs is not being criminally prosecuted or fined tor
violating the Act. Therefore, his argument that the Act is penal misses the mark.
More importantly, the l'tah Supreme Court has held that the Act's definition of
"real estate" should be broadly, rather than strictly, construed. Chade v. Morgan, 9 I tab
2d 125. 339 P.2d 1019. 1021 (1959) r'fTjhe legislature saw fit to include within the
definition of the term 'real estate' leaseholds and other interests less than leaseholds.
I his clcarlv indicates the intention of the legislature that a broad coverage be given to the
term 'real estate' for the purposes of this Act.").'
In light of the legislature's intention that the definition of "real estate" be broadly
construed. Sachs was required to have a license. I he Act specifically precludes any
person, without a valid real estate license, from recovering any compensation for
facilitating real estate transactions or finding potential purchasers ot real estate. I tali
Code Ann. ^ 61-2-1 S. ""Real estate"" includes leaseholds and business opportunities
involving real property.'1 Id. § 6l-2-2( 14).
Sachs' reliance on Anderson v. Johnsnn, 18 L'tah 4P. 160 P.2d "25 i 1945).
is misplaced. As noted above, the I "tab Supreme Court in Chade v. Morgan, held that the
term "real estate" should be given broad rather than narrow eonstrtiction. Moreover, at
the time Anderson was decided, the Act's definition of "Teal estate" did not include
"business opportunities involving real property." Anderson, 160 P.2d at "27. In lacl, the
Act's definition of "real estate" did not include a "business opportunity" until 1963.
nearlv twenty vears after Amkiwon was decided. See, Aplnt. Add. A at 13.
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Although "business opportunities" is not specificaf y defined in the Act, its plain
meaning clearly encompasses the sale of UPCM, whose only asset of any significance is
real property. See State v. Richardson, 2006 I T App. 23SS *!• 12, 139 P.3d 278. 280
(When interpreting the plain language of a particular statute, "courts presume that the
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning."); Alternative Options and Services for Children v.
Chapman, 2064 UT App. 48S.*' 35. 106 P.3d 744, 752 (When interpreting statutory
language, the court is to look at the ordinary meaning of the word, and il the ordinary
meaning results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in
blatant contradiction to the express purpose of the statute, it is not the duty of the court to
assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme.); All Points Traders, Inc. v. Harrington
Assocs., 259 Cal. Rptr. 780. 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (In accordance with principle o\
statutory interpretation that courts must give effect to the words of a statute according to
their usual and ordinary meaning, "business opportunity" encompasses any transler oi
ownership of an entire ongoing business in corporate form whether by transler oi all the
stock or all the assets.) Here, the plain meaning of business opportunity includes the
f ven under a strict statutory construction, Sachs is required to hold a real
estate license. Springer v. Rosaucr. 641 P.2d 1216, 12US (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)
(recognizing that even though penal statutes must be strictly construed, a "person
authorized to find a buyer for all of the stock of a corporation for compensation has been
held to be a real estate business opportunity broker within the meaning of th[e] statute")
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sale of UPCM, and such a meaning does not result in an application that is unreasonably
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction to the express puipose of the Act.5
B. Sachs Was Required to Possess a Real Estate License Even Though the
Transaction Was Structured as a Stock Purchase.
Sachs' contention that he was not required to hold a real estate broker's license
because the transaction was effectuated as a mergerstock purchase, as opposed to an
asset purchase, is untenable. Courts that have addressed this precise issue have rejected
it. recognizing that the licensing statutes would be reduced to feckless formalities if they
could be simply avoided by stnicturmg the transaction as a stock purchase rather than an
asset purchase.
In All Points Traders, Lnc. v. Barrington Assocs., for example, the plaintiff
"suggested] that when a business is transferred through the purchase and sale of stock,
rather than a purchase of assets and goodwill, the business opportunity licensing
requirements do not apply." 259 Cal. Rptr. 780. 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In rejecting
this argument, the court held that "[t]his view exalts form over substance of the regulated
transaction and ignores the puiposes of the regulation/' Id. (emphasis in original).
* Sachs contends that had the legislature intended the Act to cover mere
business brokers, it could have expressly provided so. This argument is also without
merit. The Act provides for a number of exemptions to the licensing requirement, but
there is no exemption for "business brokers." Utah Code Ann . § 61-2-3. When a statute
specifically provides for exceptions, items not excluded are covered by the staUite.
Chapin v. SeuhoffBroadcasting-Grand Island, Inc.. 684 NAV.2d 588. 593 (Xeb, 2004).
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Similarly, in Everett v. Goodloe, 268 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), the plaintiff
alleged that "she found abuyer for the Abaco Inn fa hotel owned by the defendant] and
that Goodloe agreed to pay her a fee for her assistance." Id. at 287. Because the buyer
purchased "100 percent of the stock" of the company, and the "deed to the real property
remained unchanged," the plaintiff "argued that a real estate license [wals not required to
collect a fee." Id. at 283. The Everett court, however, recognized that:
[t]he sale of all of the slock of the corporation was in
legal effect a sale of all of its assets, and the mere fact that the
parties found it more convenient to transfer all of the stock
rather than to make a conveyance of its assets does not
change the substance of the transaction.
Id. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).
For similar reasons, this Court must reject Sachs' attempt to defeat the intent of
the licensing statute by skirting its mandates. Simply because UPCM and CGP found it
more expedient to structure the deal as a stock purchase, rather than some other form,
'' See also /Jeff v. Medco Professional Services, Corp., 973 P.2d 1276 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1998) ("We conclude that there is no requirement that real estate or a leasehold
be transferred from one legal entity to another to trigger Tie licensure requirements.
Rather, where, as here, the corporation whose entire stock is sold holds a leasehold that
becomes the buyer's leasehold as a result of the sale, whether by transfer from the seller
or otherwise, an indirect change in a leasehold interest, and therefore, the licensure
requirements apply."); Brakhage v. Georgetown Associates, Inc., 523 P.2d 145 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1974) (Plaintiff could not recover finder's fee in connection with transaction
involving shares of corporation which owned interest in real estate); Shortt v. Knob City
Investment Company, Inc., 292 S.E.2d 737 (N.C. Ct. Apo. 1982) (sale of 100 percent of
stock constituted sale of corporation's property).
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cannot relieve Sachs of his burden of holding a real estate broker's license to recover a
fee.
The cases cited by Sachs arc inapposite. In Gruherv. Owens-Illinois Ine.. S99
F.2d 1366 (3d Cir. 1990), for example, the court applied Pennsylvania law. Under the
applicable Pennsylvania statute, "real estate" is defined as "|ajny interest or estate in
land, whether corporeal, incorporeal, freehold or nonfreehold, whether the land is situated
in this Commonwealth or elsewhere including leasehold interests and time share and
similarly designated interests." 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. $ 455.201. The definition of "real
estate" under the Pennsylvania statute, therefore, docs not include the concept ot a
"business opportunity," and it is different in the most relevant aspect from the Utah
statute.'''
Further, a subsequent Third Circuit panel found the Gruber opinion to be largely
erroneous and based upon faulty reasoning and interpretation ot case law. ( ooney v.
Rater, 939 F.2d 81, 86-88 (l^d Cir. 1991). In Coonev, the Third Circuit ultimately
rejected the holding in Gruber and determined that, under New Jersey law. real estate
licensing provisions applied to the sale of corporate stock. Id. at S8. As such, the court
!': Gruber is distinguishable for the additional reason that the company, whose
stock was purchased, had limited real estate assets. S99 F.2d at 1368.
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determined that an unlicensed broker could only recover on the purchase price ol
corporate stock that was attributable to the personal property of the corporation. Id.
Sachs cannot draw support from Silvcrtooth v. Kellcy. 91 P.2d 1112 (Or. 1939),
for the same reason. The definition of "real estate" under the controlling Oregon statute
does not include the term "business opportunity." See Or. Rev. Stat. § 696.010 (2005).
Sachs' attempt to distinguish the cases relied upon by the district court are equally
unavailing. First, although Blackthorne does not refer to its decision as being part of the
majority rule, it is undisputed that "the majority rule [is] Tat if a sale of a business
involves any real estate component, no matter how de minimus, the unlicensed broker is
dented recovery of any commission." GDC Environmcn'ai Services, Inc. v. Ransbotiom
Landfill, 740 N.F.2d 1254. 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Second, the unlicensed real estate broker in Blackthorne did not agree to find a
buyer and negotiate the "sale of the real property assets of the business," as Sachs
suggests. (Aplnt. Brief at 42.) Rather "the parties orally agreed that the defendant wouk
retain the plaintiff to locate a qualified buyerfor the business anil assist in the due
diligence, negotiation and closing process." 848 A.2d at "'27 (emphasis added). Thus,
contrary to Sachs' argument, the district court's reliance on Blackthorne was entirely
appropriate.
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Third, the district court's reliance on Andalex Resources v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 1041
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), was correct because Andalex stands for the proposition that the Act
bars both contract and quasi-contract claims for compensation brought by a "finder" who
is unlicensed. 871 P.2d at 1045. Here, the district court dismissed Sachs' contract and
quasi-contract claims for his failure to comply with the licensing requirements. The fact
that Andalex involved the sale of leaseholds rather than the sale of stock is irrelevant.
C. The District Court Did Not Rule That Sachs' Offer to Accept His
Finder's Fee in the Form of Two Prime Developed Lots Required Him
to Be Licensed Under the Act.
Sachs next contends that the district court erroneously ruled that Sachs" offer to
receive payment of his alleged finder's fee in the form of "a couple of prime developed
lots in the new project," required him to be licensed under the Act. The district court
made no such ruling.
Rather, the district court concluded that the sale of UPCM was a "'business
opportunity involving real property" requiring Sachs to have a real estate license. (R. at
2209-10.) In its minute entry, the district court simply pointed out that Sachs knew that
the sale of UPCM was a "business opportunity involving real estate" as evidenced by.
among other things, Sachs' offer to be paid in the form of developed lots owned by
UPCM. Accordingly, Sachs' argument fails. {Id.)
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D. Sachs Is Not Exempt From the Act.
Sachs' argument that there are "common law exceptions" to the licensing statute is
simply unsustainable. The cases referenced by Sachs to sjpport this contention discuss
the licensing requirements of contractors. Neither American Rural Cellular v. Systems
Communication Corp., 890 P.2d 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), nor Covert Copier Painting
v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), addresses a real estate broker's
licensing requirement. Thecommon law exception discussed in those two cases is
limited to the contractor's licensing statute and is entirely irrelevant to the present issues.
E. Requiring Sachs to Have a License Is Not Contrary to the Act's
Purpose.
Sachs1 argument that the Act was nol intended to protect sophisticated parties such
as Lesser, UPCM and Rothwell also fails. This argument was expressly rejected by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Andalex Resources, v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
In Andalex, the plaintiff asserted that because he did not deal with the general
public, which the Act was meant to protect, but rather approached sophisticated contacts,
his actions did not fall under the purpose of the licensing provisions and should not be
governed by them. Id. at 1045.
In rejecting this argument, this Court held that:
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We disagree with [plaintiffs] premise that the
presumed purpose of a statute overrides its literal terms. . . .
liven if we accept the argument that the purpose of the statute
overrides the statute's unambiguous language, the services
provided by Myers still fall within the purpose of the
licensing statutes. The legislature clearly intended the
licensing requirement to apply to "finders." [citation omitted |
Further, nothing suggests that "sophisticated" corporate
entities such as Andalex should not be entitled to the same
protection as the general public under the statute.
Id. at 1045 & n.b (internal citations omitted).
For precisely the same reason. Sachs' contention that the licensing statute does not
protect defendants must be rejected.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED SACHS' CLAIMS FOR
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The Utah Statute of Frauds requires "ever)- agreement authorizing or employing
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation" to be in writing.
Utah Code Ann. $ 25-5-4( 1)(e) (emphasis added). Ihis provision applies with equal
force to purported "finder's agreements." Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. IVestern
Real Estate A Dec. Co., 779 P.2d 230. 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (The Statute of Frauds
"applies broadly to agreements requiring compensation for brokering real estate.
including finder's agreements, and not just to contracts employing brokers to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation."); C.J. Realty, Inc. v. IVillcv, 758 P.2d 923 (UtahCt.
App. 19S8) iThe Statute of Frauds "applies to the commission agreements ot real estate
brokers generally and not just to contracts employing brokers to 'purchase or sell real
estate for compensation."'). To comply with the Statute of Frauds, a tinder's i'ee
agreement "must contain all the essential terms and provisions of the contract to which
the parties have agreed." Machan, 11{) P.2d at 234. At a minimum, a finder's fee
agreement must contain "the critical terms of a finder's fee agreement." including the
identity of the finder, the finder's clients, the propert) owner who will owe a commission
to the finder if a transaction is closed, and the commission rate. See C.J. Realty, 758 P.2d
at 928. Further, the "writings must so clearly evidence tre fact that a contract was made,
and what its terms arc. "that there is no serious possibility "hat the assertion of the
contract is false/" Machan, 779 P.2d at 235 (quoting 2A. Corbin, ('orbin on Contracts
$ 512 at 547(1950)).
Sachs1 alleged oral finder's fee agreement fails to meet these requirements. As
explained above, the term "real estate" includes, by statutory definition, "business
opportunities involving real estate." Utah Code Ann § 0l-2-2( 14). Because the sale of
UPCM (whose only significant asset was real estate) was a "business opportunity
involving real estate," any agreement to locate a buyer for UPCM had to be in writing.
Machan, 779 P.2d at 234. It is undisputed that no writing satisfying the statute of frauds
exists.
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A. The Statute of Frauds Requires an Oral Contract to Find a Purchaser
of a Corporation to He in Writing Where the Corporation's Assets
Consist Primarily of Real Propert).
Sachs next contends that the plain language of the Utah Statute of Frauds does not
require an oral contract to find a purchaser for a corporation for a fee to be in writing and
that had the legislature so intended, it could have easily and expressly so provided.
Sachs' argument ignores the law.
Statutes are considered to be in pari materiel and must be construed together when
thev relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the
same purpose or object. ./,/."'. v. State. Piv. of Chald and Family Services. 2001 1.4
App. 271, %i 15, 33 P.3d 59, 63. When considering statutes related to the same subject
matter, courts will attempt to construe them in harmony such that effect is giv en to every
provision in all of them. I.M.F v. State, 2002 IT App. 110, lj 19, 61 P.3d 1038. 1047.
Moreover, "where two statutes treat the same subject matter, and one statute is general
while the other is specific, the specific prov ision controls." Floyd v. IVestern Surgical
Assoc.. ""3 P.2d 401. 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
I lore, it is clear that the Act and the Utah Statute of Frauds relate to the same class
of persons and things (i.e. broker's and the sale of real estate) and have the same purpose
and object. Thus, the statutes should be construed together and the Act's more specific
definition of "real estate" should control in this case.
If ' *. r^T ~~:?c??~
H. The Alleged Agreement Was Not Removed From the Statute of Frauds
by Part Performance.
Sachs1 contention that lie may recover under the doctrine of part performance is
simply incorrect. In Case v. Ralph, 9 Utah 2d 125, 188 640 (1920), the Utah Supreme
Court recognized that under the statute of frauds, "a real estate broker or agent cannot
recover commission for services rendered in cither selling or procuring a purchaser for
real property unless . . . there is an express contract," and that "performance or part
performance of a parol agreement is unavailing." Id. at 642: accord Smith Realty Co. v.
Dipietro, 11 Utah 176, 292 P. 915, 917 (1930).
Additionally, even if the doctrine of part performance was available, Sachs has
failed to establish the requisite elements with "strong" evidence. Spears v. IVarr, 2002
UT 24, * 24. 44 P.3d 742. To recover tinder the doctrine of part performance, Sachs must
show,
[ 1] the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite;
|2| the acts done in performance of the cor tract must be
equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts must be in reliance
on the contract. Such acts m reliance must be such that (a)
they would not have been performed had the contract not
existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the
promisor would result in fraud on the performer who relied,
since damages would be inadequate.
Id. Sachs has not established any of these elements. First, the terms of the alleged
contract were anything but clear and deiinite. Sachs1 letter of May 17, 2001, proposes
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consideration of "cash, a couple of prime developed lots in the new project, or some other
consideration acceptable to both of us." .See. Statement of Facts ("SOF") ' 34. supra.
Sachs himself admitted that he did not have anything specific in mind with respect to the
"consideration acceptable to both of us." Rather, he was trying "to draw [Rothwell] out
to come up with something." Id. r 35. Moreover, there was never any agreement as to
the amount of any fee or any calculation to determine it. /d. *\ 36.
Second. Sachs did not perform clear and definite acts pursuant to the alleged
contract. Rather. Sachs made a few calls relating to (iranite. whom Sachs purported to
represent all along. Sachs never attended any meetings between UPCM and Jackson, was
never asked to simi a confidentiality aureement with I 'PCM and never participated in any
negotiations w i th UPCM. Id.* 51. In fact. Sachs onlv learned of CGP's agreement to
purchase UPCM like the rest of the world, through a newspaper article. Id.
Third. Sachs' efforts were not done in reliance on the alleged contract. As
referenced above, all of Sachs" efforts were in pursuit of a deal he was attempting to
arrange tor his client Granite. Id. Thus. Sachs' claims were properly dismissed.
III. IMF DISTRICT ( OLRT PROPFRFV DISMISSED SACHS'
DECLARATORY RFLIFF AND CONTRACT CLAIMS BECAUSE NO
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONTRACT WAS MADE.
A. There Is no Express Contract.
Sachs admits that defendants did not assent either verbally or in writing to the
MA' 1 7Under's fee stated in Sachs" letter. Sachs nevertheless chiims that his letter of Mav
2001, provided a formula or method for fixing the price. In that regard, Sachs claims that
he provided testimony that the "couple of prime developed lots in the new project"
owned by UPCM referenced in his letter had a value of approximately two million dollars
and that this amount represented about 3'\, of the purchase price of UPCM. which was an
appropriate finder's fee based on his experience and the si/e of the deal. Sachs'
argument is without merit tor several reasons.
First, by Sachs1 own admission, die only purchaser about which defendants and
Sachs had any discussions was Granite. Sachs" letters only discussed Granite. SOF
*;1| 34, 38. For exaniple, the letter of Ma)' 17, 2001, states: "I certami)' will continue to do
everything in tuv power to bring together a mutually satisfactory agreement between
these two parlies" 'L\nd that "1 look forward to continuing out quest to link these two
parties for everyone's benefit . . , ." ///. r 34. (emphasis added). Sachs' letter of May
18, 2001, is to the same effect. This letter states: " I understand, after a conversation
with .\oc Lessor [sic], that his preference would be to sell the company rather than to
DMWL'S'I ^382370 V. 38
enter into a joint venture." Ld. '| 38. It then discusses a possible sale of UPCM to
Granite: ''Happily, if your company's preference is sale, Granite, as I suggested in
yesterday's letter, is still an excellent prospect. Another investor, together with Granite,
would make an excellent purchaser." Ld. The only tenable interpretation of these letters
is that any pui"portcd express agreement about a finder's fee was limited to a deal
between UPCM and Granite.
Second, in responding to Sachs1 letters. Lesser purportedly stated "I don't want a
joint venture partner. I want this sold." Lesser did not tell Sachs to go find another buyer
or that Sachs would be paid a finder's fee. Id. *[ 37.
Third. Sachs' testimony that a couple of prime developed lots were worth $2
million and that this amount is approximately 3% of UPCM's purchase price is nothing
other than speculation and conjecture, which cannot defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Glover v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 923 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Utah 1996). In that
regard. Sachs' testimony is based on information he learned after the purported finder's
fee agreement was made. At the time Sachs purported to enter into the alleged
agreement, the development had not been completed and there was no established
purchase price for UPCM. Indeed, CGP and UPCM originally agreed to a purchase price
of approximately S83 million, which was subsequently reduced to approximately S67
million. SOF fl 49. 54.
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Finally, Sachs' reliance on Central Missouri Professional Services, Inc. v.
Shoemaker, 108 S.W.3d 6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003), is misplaced. The facts in Shoemaker
are not remotely similar to the undisputed facts in this case. In Shoemaker, the plaintiff
instructed the defendant to proceed with the work, which it did. At issue was whether the
defendant's "verbal acceptance" of a written proposal created an oral contract binding on
the defendant. The defendant had accepted mvoiecs from the plaintiffbut later refused to
pay them. The Missouri court concluded that there was a binding contract because "it is
a well settled rule of law that a written offer may be orally accepted." Id. at 9.
In contrast, Sachs admits that defendants never responded to his letter of May 17,
2001. Moreover, it is undisputed that this letter refers only to Granite. Based on the
foregoing, no reasonable jurycould find that an express agreement was ever made.
B. There Is no Implied Contract,
To prove the existence of an implied-in-fact contract, Sachs must show: (1) the
defendant requested the plaintiff to perform work: (2) the plaintiff expected the defendant
to compensate him or her for those services: and (3) the defendant knew or should have
known that the plaintiffexpected compensation. Promax. Development Corp. v. Mattson,
943 P.2d 247, 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269
(Utah. Ct. App. 1987)). To establish an implied-m-law contract, also called a quasi-
contract or unjust enrichment, Sachs is required to prove: (1) the defendant received a
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benefit: (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3 >under
circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without
paving for it. Id. "[T]he test" is whether "[u]nder all the evidence, were the
eiremnstances such that the plaintiff could reasonably assume he was to be paid and that
the defendant should have reasonably expected to pay for such services." Mc Collum v.
Clothier. 121 Utah 31 1, 241 P.2d 46S. 470 (1952). Sachs cannot establish these
elements.
First. Sachs did not confer any benefit on Defendants. At the time of his initial
telephone conversation with Sachs, it is undisputed that Jackson already knew I_ PCA1
was lor sale and was working on a purchase. See. SOF *\\ 44. It is also undisputed that
Sachs did not tell Jackson anything about UPCM that he did not already know.
Moreover, Sachs admits that he provided no other assistance to UPCM or Jackson. He
did not attend meetings, participate in due diligence, or negotiate the terms and
conditions of the purchase. Id. *j 5 1. Accordingly, Sachs did not find Jackson as a
purchaser for UPC Al and did not confer any benefit on Defendants.
Second, it is undisputed that defendants neither knew or should have known that
Sachs expected to receive a fee as a consequence of Jackson's or CGP's purchase ot
UPCM. Bv Sachs" own admission, the only purchaser about which defendants and Sachs
had anv discussions was Granite. Sachs' letters onlv discussed (.iranite. and Sachs had no
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further communications with defendants regarding a finder's fee between May 17. 20(11.
and the lime of CGP\s purchase of UPCM. Id. fl 34, 37. Because Sachs never notified
defendants he expected to be compensated in the event either Jackson or (XfP purchased
UPCM, there is no basis upon which defendants could have had such an expectation. See
ProMax Pcv. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247, 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
where the plaintiff fails to inform the defendant of the essential facts, the defendant
cannot have known the plaintiff expected to be compensated)."
Sachs argues that an implied contract was made because he sent a letter to
Rothwell on May 17, 2001. that referenced a finder's fee and that Rothwell and Lesser
"never advised . . . Sachs that they would not pay him a tinder's fee according to the
terms proposed in his letter." Ilow ev er. Sachs' letters only discuss a possible deal
between UPCM and Granite. The only tenable interpretation of the letters is that any
purported express agreement about a finder's fee was limited to a deal between UPCM
and (iranite.
1' Sachs complains that had Jackson or the defendants told him he was not
eligible for a finder's fee in the event a deal was consummated between them, he would
have found another buyer or altered his actions. But the law does not impose a duty upon
defendants to disabuse Sachs of his erroneous beliefs: "|T]he law should not require
everyone to keep on guard against such possibilities by warning persons offering services
that no pay is to be expected." McCollunu 241 P.2d at 470.
11 The May letters were written by Sachs; therefore, responsibility for any
misunderstanding between the parties with respect to the legal effect of those letters
i continued ..)
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This conclusion is supported by the cases Sachs cites. In Moore v. Kuehn, 002
SAY.2d 713 (Mo. App. 1980), the plaintiff contractor had submitted a written proposal to
the defendant for various repair projects. Id. at "1 cv Instead of signing the proposal, as
the plaintiff asked, the defendant requested time to study the proposal, though he told the
plaintiff to begin the repair work. Id. Fventually. the plaintiff completed all of the
proposed work without objection, but the defendant refused to pay the plaintiff, citing the
lack of a contract. Id. The court, however, found that by knowingly permitting the
plaintiff to perform the repair work, the defendant had accepted the written offer, and that
the written proposal constituted the terms of the contract. Id. ('The terms of that writing
therefore necessarily controlled the oral contract established at that point."I.
In sum, Sachs was, at most, an officious mtermeddler in the transaction between
CGP and UPCM. As such, it would be unjust to permit him to recover a multi-million
dollar fee for alleged work that conferred no benefit on defendants and about which
defendants were completely unaware. See Lcmeron, Inc. v. Ferraro Energy Corp., 861
P.2d 319. 323 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (Compensation under quasi-contract is not mandated
(...continued)
which Sachs argues accurate])' reflect the parties' agreement - lies with Sachs. I .B.C.,
Inc. v. R.O.A. Gem, Inc., 909 P.2d 945. 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting the general rule
that unresolved ambiguities m a document will ultimately be construed against the
drafter).
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where sen ices were rendered in the expectation of a hopec-for contract or simplv to gain
a business advantage).
CONCLUSION
For the forenoiniz reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's order
dismissing Sachs' claims with prejudice.
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61-2-1 License required.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or
assume to act as a principal real estate broker, associate real estate broker, or a real estate sales
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agent within this state without a license obtained under this chapter.
(2) It isunlawful for any person outside the state to engage in the business, act in the capacity of,
advertise, or assume to act as a principal real estate broker, associate real estate broker, or a real
estate sales agent with respect to real estate located within the state without a license obtained
under this chapter.
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61-2-2 Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate broker" means any person employed or engaged
as an independent contraclor by or on behalfof a licensed principal real estate broker to perform
any act set out in Subsection (12) for valuable consideration, who has qualified under the
provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate broker.
(2) "Branch office" means a principal broker's real estate brokerage office other than his main
office.
(3) "Commission" means the Real Estate Commission established under this chapter.
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a concurring role must jointly agree for action to be
taken.
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as defined in Section 57-8-3 .
(6) "Condominium homeowners' association" means all of the condominium unit owners acting
as a group in accordance with declarations and bylaws.
(7) (a) "Condominiumhotel" means one or more condominium units that are operated as a hotel.
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel consisting of condominium units, all of which
are owned by a single entity.
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Real Estate.
(9) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate.
(10) "Executive director" means the director of the Department of Commerce.
(11) "Main office" means the address which a principal broker designates with the division as his
primary brokerage office.
(12) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal broker" means any person:
(a) (i) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, or auctions real estate, options on real estate,
or improvements on real estate with the expectation of receiving valuable consideration; or
(ii) who advertises, offers, attempts, or otherwise holds himself out to be engaged in the business
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described in Subsection (12)(a)(i);
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real estate or by a prospective purchaser of real
estate who performs any of the acts described in Subsection (12)(a), whether his compensation is
at a stated salary, a commission basis, upon a salary and commission basis, or otherwise;
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable consideration, manages property owned by
another person or who advertises or otherwise holds himself out to be engaged in property
management:
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable consideration, assists or directs in the
procurement of prospects for or the negotiation of the transactions listed in Subsections (12)(a)
and (c); and
(e) except for mortgage lenders, title insurance agents, and their employees, who assists or
directs in the closing of any real estate transaction with the expectation of receiving valuable
consideration.
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging in, with the expectation of receiving valuable
consideration, the management of property owned by another person or advertising or otherwise
claiming to be engaged in property management by:
(i) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, offering, or otherwise attempting or participating in a
transaction calculated to secure the rental or leasing of real estate;
(ii) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise attempting to collect rent for the real estate and
accounting for and disbursing the money collected; or
(iii) authorizing expenditures for repairs to the real estate.
(b) "Property management" does not include:
(i) hotel or motel management;
(ii) rental of tourist accommodations, including hotels, motels, tourist homes, condominiums,
condominium hotels, mobile home park accommodations, campgrounds, or similar public
accommodations for any period of less than 30 consecutive days, and the management activities
associated with these rentals; or
(iii) the leasing or management of surface or subsurface minerals or oil and gas interests, if the
leasing or management is separate from a sale or lease of the surface estate.
(14) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business opportunities involving real property.
(15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" mean any person affiliated with a licensed
pnncipal real estate broker, either as an independent contractor or an employee as provided in
Section 61-2-25 , to perform for valuable consideration any act set out in Subsection (12).
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an individual who performs a service for wages or
other remuneration, whose employer withholds federal employment taxes under a contract of
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hire, written or oral, express or implied.
(b) "Regular salaried employee" does not include a person who performs services on a project-
by-project basis or on a commission basis.
(17) "Reinstatement" means restoring a license that has expired or has been suspended.
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a licensee may obtain a license following
revocation of the license.
(19) "Renewal" means extending a license for an additional licensing period on or before the
date the license expires.
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61-2-3 Exempt persons and transactions.
(1) (a) Except asprovided in Subsection (l)(b), a license under this chapter is not required for:
(i) any person who as owner or lessor performs the acts described in Subsection 61-2-2 (12) with
reference to property owned or leased by that person;
(ii) a regular salaried employee of the owner or lessorof real estate who, with reference to
nonresidential real estate owned or leased by the employer, performs the acts enumerated in
Subsections 61-2-2 (12)(a) and (b);
(iii) a regular salaried employee of the owner of real estate who performs property management
services with reference to real estate owned by the employer, except that the employee may only
manage property for one employer;
(iv) a person who performs property management services for the apartments at which that
person resides in exchange for free or reduced rent on that person's apartment;
(v) a regular salaried employee of a condominium homeowners' association who manages real
property subject to the declaration of condominium that established the homeowners' association,
except that the employee may only manage property for one condominium homeowners'
association; and
(vi) a regular salaried employee of a licensed property management company who performs
support services, as prescribed by rule, for the property management company.
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not exempt from licensing:
(i) employees engaged in the sale of properties regulated under Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act and Title 57, Chapter 19, Timesharc and Camp Resort Act;
(ii) employees engaged in the sale of cooperative interests regulated under Title 57, Chapter 23,
Real Estate Cooperative Marketing Act; or
(iii) any person whose interest as an owner or lessor was obtained by him or transferred to him
for the purpose of evading the application of this chapter, and not for any other legitimate
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business reason.
(2) A license under this chapter is not required for:
(a) isolated transactions by persons holding aduK executed power ofattorney from the owner;
(b) services rendered by an attorney at law mperforming his duties as an attorney at law;
(c) areceiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administrator, executor, or any person acting under order of
any court;
(d) a trustee or its employees under a deed of trust ur a will; or
(e) any public utility, its officers, or regular salaried employees, unless performance of any of the
acts set out in Subsection 61-2-2 (12) is in connection with the sale, purchase, lease, orother
disposition of real estate or investment in real estate unrelated to the principal business activity
of that public utility.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b). a license under this chapter is not required for
any person registered to act as abroker-dealer, agent, or investment advisor under the L'tah and
federal securities laws in the sale or the offer for sale of real estate if:
(i) the real estate is a necessary element ofa "security" as that term is defined by the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act ol 1934; and
(ii) the security is registered for sale pursuant to the Securities Act of1933 or by Title 61,
Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Securities Act.
(b) The exemption in Subsection (3)(a) docs not apply to exempt or resale transactions.
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61-2-4 One act for compensation qualifies person as broker or sales agent.
Except as provided in Section 61-2-3 , one act, for valuable consideration, of buying, selling,
leasing, managing, or exchanging real estate for another, or of offering for another to buy, sell,
lease, mamme. or exchange real estate, requires the person performing, offering, or attempting to
perform the~act to be licensed as aprincipal real estate broker, an associate real estate broker, or
a real estate sales agent as set forth in this chapter.
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61-2-5 Division of Real Estate created - Functions - Director appointed - Functions.
(1) There is created within the Department ofCommerce a Division ofReal Estate. It is
responsible for the administration and enforcement of:
(a) this chapter:
(b) Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act;
(c) Title 57, Chapter 19, Timeshare and Camp Resort Act;
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(d) Title 57, Chapter 23, Real Estate Cooperative Marketing Act;
(c) Chapter 2a, Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund;
(0 Chapter 2b, Real Estate Appraiser Licensing and Certification Act; and
(g) Chapter 2c, L'tah Residential Mortgage Practices Act.
(2) The division is under the direction and control of a director appointed by the executive
director of the department with the approval of the governor. The director holds the office oi'
director at the pleasure of the governor.
(3) The director, with the approval of the executive director, may employ personnel necessary to
discharge the duties of the division at salaries to be fixed by the director according to standards
established by the Department of Administrative Services.
(4) On or before October 1of each year, the director shall, in conjunction with the department,
report to the governor and the Legislature concerning the division's work for the preceding fiscal
year ending June 30.
(5) The director, in conjunction with the executive director, shall prepare and submit to the
governor and the Legislature a budget for the fiscal year next following the convening of the
Legislature.
2000
61-2-5.1 Procedures - Adjudicative proceedings.
The Division of Real Estate shall comply with the procedures ind requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its adjudicative proceedings.
1997
61-2-5.5 Real Estate Commission created - Functions - Appointment - Qualification and
terms of members - Expenses - Meetings.
(1) There is created within the division a Real Estate Commission. The commission shall:
(a) make rules for the administration of this chapter which arc not inconsistent with this chapter,
including:
(1) licensing of principal brokers, associate brokers, sales agems., real estate companies, and
branch offices;
(ii) prelicensing and postlicensing education curricula, examination procedures, and the
certification and conduct of real estate schools, course providers, and instructors;
(in) proper handling of funds received bv real estate licensees, and brokerage office procedures
and recordkeeping requirements;
(iv) property management; and
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(v) standards of conduct for real estate licensees;
(b) establish, with the concurrence of the division, all fees as provided in this chapter and Title
61, Chapter 2a, Real Estate Recovery Fund Act;
(c) conduct all administrative hearings not delegated by it to an administrative law judge relating
to the licensing of any applicant, conduct of any licensee, or the certification or conduct of any
real estate school, course provider, or instructor regulated under this chapter;
(d) with the concurrence of the director, impose sanctions against licensees and certificate
holders as provided in Section 61-2-11 ;
(e) advise the director on the administration and enforcement-of any matters affecting the
division and the real estate sales and property management industries;
(f) advise the director on matters affecting the division budget;
(g) advise and assist the director in conducting real estate seminars; and
(h) perform other duties as provided by this chapter and Title 61, Chapter 2a, Real Estate
Recovery Fund Act.
(2) (a) The commission shall be comprised of five members appointed by the governor and
approved by the Senate.
(b) Four of the commission members shall have at least five years' experience in the real estate
business and shall hold an active principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent license.
(c) One commission member shall be a member of the general public.
(d) No more than ohq commission member may be appointed from any given county in the state.
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms ofcurrent commission members expire, the
governor shall appoint each new member or reappointed member to a four-year term ending June
30.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements ofSubsection (a), the governor shall, at the time of
appointment or reappointment, adjust the length ofterms to ensure that the terms ofcommission
members arc staggered so that approximately half of the commission is appointed every two
years.
(c) A commission member may not serve more than one consecutive term.
(d) Members of the commission shall annually select one member to serve as chair.
(4) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be appointed
for the unexpired term.
(5) (a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits for their services, but may receive per
diem and expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the rates
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established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-1 06 and 63A-3-107 .
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service.
(6) The commission shall meet at least monthly. The director may call additional meetings at his
discretion or upon the request of the chair or upon the written request of three or more
commission members. Three members constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.
1996
61-2-6 Licensing procedures and requirements.
(1) The Real Estate Commission shall determine the qualifications and requirements of
applicants for a principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent license. The division, with the
concurrence of the commission, shall require and pass upon proof necessary to determine the
honesty, integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and competency of each applicant for an initial
license or for renewal of an existing license. The division, with the concurrence of the
commission, shall require an applicant for a sales agent license to complete an approved
educational program not to exceed 90 hours, and an applicant for an associate broker or principal
broker license to complete an approved educational program not to exceed 120 hours. The hours
required by this section mean 50 minutes of instruction in each 60 minutes; and the maximum
number of program hours available to an individual is ten hours per day. The division, with the
concurrence of the commission, shall require the applicant to pass an examination approved by
the commission covering the fundamentals of the English language, arithmetic, bookkeeping,
real estate principles and practices, the provisions of this chapter, the rules established by the
Real Estate Commission, and any other aspect of Utah real estate license law considered
appropriate. Three years' full-time experience as a real estate sales agent or its equivalent is
required before any applicant may apply for, and secure a principal broker or associate broker
license in this state. The commission shall establish by rule the criteria by which it will accept
experience or special education in similar fields of business in lieu of the three years' experience.
(2) (a) The division, with the concurrence of the commission, may require an applicant to furnish
a sworn statement setting forth evidence satisfactory to the division of the applicant's reputation
and competency as set forth by rule.
(b) The division shall require an applicant to provide his Social Security number, which is a
private record under Subsection 63-2-302 (l)(h).
(3) A nonresident principal broker may be licensed in this state by conforming to all the
provisions of this chapter except that of residency. A nonresident associate broker or sales agent
may become licensed in this state by conforming to all the provisions of this chapter except that
of residency and by being employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf of
a nonresident or resident principal broker who is licensed in this state.
(4) An applicant who has had a real estate license revoked shall be relicensed as prescribed for
an original application, but may not apply for a new license until at least five years after the
revocation. In the case of an applicant for a new license as a principal broker or associate broker,
the applicant is not entitled to credit for experience gained prior to the revocation of license.
2004
61-2-7 Form of license - Display of license.
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The division shall issue to each licensee a wall license showing the name and address of the
licensee. The seal of the state shall be affixed to each license. Each license shall contain any-
other matter prescribed by the division and shall be delivered or mailed to the address furnished
by the licensee. The wall licenses of principal brokers, associate brokers, and sales agents who
are affiliated with an office shall be kept in the office to be made available on request.
1991
61-2-7.1 Change of address - Failure to notify.
Each licensee or certificate holder shall send the division a signed statement notifying the
division of any change of principal business location or home street address within ten business
days of the change. In providing an address to the division a physical location or street address
must be provided. Failure to notify the division of a change of business location is separate
grounds for disciplinary action against the licensee or certificate holder. A licensee or certificate
holder will be considered to have received any notification which has been sent to the last
address furnished to the division by the licensee.
2000
61-2-7.2. Reporting requirements.
Principal brokers, associate brokers, and sales agents shall send the division a signed statement
notifying the division of the following within ten business days:
(1) conviction of any criminal offense; or
(2) filing a personal or brokerage bankruptcy.
2000^
61-2-8 Discharge of associate broker or sales agent by principal broker - Notice.
If an associate broker or sales agent is discharged by a principal broker, the principal broker
shall, within three days, send the division a signed statement notifying the division of the
discharge. The principal broker shall address a communication to the last-known residence
address of that associate broker or sales agent advising him that notice of his termination has
been delivered or sent to the division. It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent to
perform any of the acts under this chapter, directly or indirectly, from and after the date of
receipt of the termination notice until affiliation with a principal broker has been established.
2000
61-2-9 Examination and license fees - Background check - Renewal of licenses - Education
requirements - Activation of inactive licenses - Recertification - Licenses of firm,
partnership, or association - Miscellaneous fees.
(1) (a) Upon filing an application for a principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent license
examination, the applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as determined by the commission with
the concurrence of the division under Section 63-38-3.2 for admission to the examination.
(b) A principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as
detemiined by the commission with the concurrence of the division under Section 63-38-3.2 for
issuance of an initial license or license renewal.
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(c) Each license issued under this subsection shall be issued for aperiod of not less than two
years as determined by the division with the concurrence of the commission.
(d) (i) Any new sales agent applicant shall submit fingerprint cards in a form acceptable to the
division at the time the license application is filed and shall consent to a fingerprint background
check by the Utah Bureau ofCriminal Identification and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation
regarding the application.
(ii) The division shall request the Department ofPublic Safety to complete aFederal Bureau of
Investigation criminal background check for each new sales agent applicant through the national
criminal history system (MC1C) or any successor system.
(hi) The cost ofthe background check and the fingerprinting shall be borne by the applicant.
(e) (i) Any new sales agent license issued under this section snail be conditional, pending
completion ofthe criminal background check. If the criminal background check discloses the
applicant has failed to accurately disclose a criminal history, the license shall be immediately and
automatically revoked.
(ii) Any person whose conditional license has been revoked under Subsection (l)(c)(i) shall be
entitled to a post-revocation hearing to challenge the revocation. The hearing shall be conducted
in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(2) (a) (i) A license expires if it is not renewed on or before its expiration date.
(ii) As as a condition of renewal, each active licensee shall demonstrate competence:
(A) by viewing an approved real estate education video program and completing a
supplementary workbook, or
(B) by completing 12 hours ofprofessional education approved by the division and commission
within each two-year renewal period.
(iii) The division with the concurrence of the commission shall certify education which may
include state conventions, home study courses, video courses, and closed circuit television
courses.
(iv) The commission with concurrence of the division may exempt a licensee from this education
requirement for a period not to exceed four years:
(A) upon a finding of reasonable cause, including military service; and
(B) under conditions established by rule made in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) For a period of 30 days after the expiration date, a license may bereinstated upon payment of
a renewal fee and a late fee determined by the commission with the concurrence of the division
under Section 63-38-3.2 and upon providing proof acceptable to the division and the commission
of the licensee having completed the hours of education or demonstrated competence as required
under Subsection (2)(a).
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(c) After this 30-day period, and until six months after the expiration date, the license may be
reinstated by:
(i) pa\ing a renewal fee and a late fee determined by the commission with the concurrence of the
division under Section 63-38-3.2 :
(ii) providing to the division proof ofsatisfactory completion of 12 hours ofcontinuing
education:
(A) in addition to the requirements for a timely renewal: and
(B) on asubject determined by the commission by rule made in accordance with Iitle 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act; and
(iii) providing proof acceptable to the division and the commission ofthe licensee having
completed the hours ofeducation or demonstrated competence as required under Subsection (2)
(a).
(d) Aperson who does not renew his license \\ ithin six months after the expiration date shall be
relicensed as prescribed for an original application.
(3) (a) As acondition for the activation ofan inactive license that was in an inactive status at the
time of the licensee's most recent renewal, the licensee shall supply the division with proof of:
(l) successful completion of the respective sales agent or broker licensing examination within six
months prior to applying to activate the license; or
(ii) the successful completion of 12 hours of continuing education that the licensee would have
been required to complete under Subsection (2)(a) ifthe license had been on active status at the
time of the licensee's most recent renewal.
(b) The commission may, in accordance with Title 63. Chapter 46a, L'tah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, establish by rule:
(i) the nature or tvpe ofcontinuing education required for reactivation of a license; and
(ii) how Ions prior to reactivation the continuing education must have been completed.
(4) Aprincipal broker license may be grained to acorporation, partnership, or association it the
corporation, partnership, or association has affiliated with it an individual who has qualified as a
principal broker under the terms of this chapter, and who serves in the capacity of aprincipal
broker. Application for the licence shall be made in accordance with the rules adopted by the
division with the concurrence of the commission.
(5) The division may charge and collect reasonable fees determined by the commission with the
concurrence of the diusion under Section 03-3S-3.2 to cover the costs tor:
(a) issuance of a new or duplicate license;
(b) license histories or certifications;
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(c) certified copies ofoffic.al documents, orders, and other papers and transcripts;
(d) certifying real estate schools, courses, and instructors, the fees for which shall,
notwithstanding Section 13-1-2 , be deposited in the Real Lstate Education, Research, and
Recovery Fund;and
(e) other duties required by this chapter.
(6) If alicensee submits or causes to be submitted acheck, draft, or other negotiable instrument
to the division for payment of fees, and the check, draft, or other negotiable instrument is
dishonored, the transaction for which the payment was submitted is void and will be reversed by
the division ifpayment of the applicable fee is not received in rull.
(7) The fees under this chapter and the additional license fee for the Real Lstate Lducation,
Research, and Recovery Fund under Section 6l-2a-4 are in lieu ofall other license fees or
assessments that might otherwise be imposed or charged by the state or any of its political
subdivisions, upon, or as i. condition of, the privilege ofconducting the business regulated by ^
this chapter, except that a political subdivision within the state may charge a business license lee
if the licensee maintains a place of business within the jurisdiction of the political subdivision.
Unless otherwise exempt, each licensee under this chapter is subject to all taxes imposed under
Title 59, Revenue and Taxation.
2004
61-2-10 Restriction on commissions - Affiliation with more than one broker - Specialized
licenses - Designation of agents or brokers.
(1) It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent to accept valuable consideration for the
performance ofany ofthe acts specified in this chapter from any person except the principal
broker with whom he is affiliated and licensed.
(2) An inactive associate broker orsales agent is not authorized to conduct real estate
transactions until the inactive associate broker or sales agent becomes affiliated with a licensed
principal broker and submits the required documentation to the division. An inactive principal
broker is not authorized to conduct real estate transactions until the principal broker's license is
activated with the division.
(3) No sales agent orassociate broker may affiliate with more than one principal broker at the
same time.
(4) (a) Except as provided by rule, a principal broker may not be responsible for more than one
real estate brokerage at the same time.
(b) In addition to issuing principal broker, associate broker, and sales agent licenses authorizing
the performance of all of the acts set forth in Subsection 61-2-2 (12), the division may issue
specialized sales licenses and specialized property management licenses with the scope of
practice limited to the specialty. An individual may hold a specialized license in addition to a
license to act as a principal broker, an associate broker, or a sales agent. The commission may
adopt rules pursuant to 1itle 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, for the
administration of this provision, including prclicensing and postliccnsing education
requirements, examination requirements, affiliation with real estate brokerages or property
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management companies, and other licensing procedures.
(c) An individual may not be a principal broker ofa brokerage and a sales agent or associate
broker for a different brokerage at the same time.
(5) Anv owner, purchaser, lessor, or lessee who engages the services of a principal broker may
designate which sales agents or associate brokers affiliated with that principal broker will also
represent that owner, purchaser, lessor, or lessee in the purchase, sale, lease, or exchange ofreal
estate, or in exercising an option relating to real estate.
1996
61-2-11 Investigations- Subpoena power of division - Grounds for disciplinary action.
The division may investigate or cause to be investigated the actions of any principal broker,
associate broker, sales agent, real estate school, course provider, or school instructor licensed or
certified by this state, or ofany applicant for licensure or certification, or ofany person who acts
in any ofthose capacities within this state. The division is empowered to subpoena witnesses,
take evidence, and require by subpoena duces tecum the production of books, papers, contracts,
records, other documents, or information considered relevant to the investigation. The division
may serve subpoenas by certified mail. Each failure to respond to a subpoena is considered as a
separate violation ofthis chapter. The commission, with the concurrence ofthe director, may
impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per violation, impose educational
requirements, and suspend, revoke, place on probation, or deny renewal, reinstatement, or
reissuance of anv license or any certification if at any time the licensee or certificate holder,
whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation:
(2) making any false promises ofa character likely to influence, persuade, or induce;
(3) pursuing acontinued and flagrant course of misrepresentation, or of making false promises
through agents, sales agents, advertising, or otherwise;
(4) acting for more than one party in a transaction without the informed consent ofall parties;
(5) acting as an associate broker or sales agent while not licensed with a licensed principal
broker, representing or attempting to represent a broker other than the principal broker with
whom he is affiliated, or representing as sales agent or having a contractual relationship similar
to that of sales agent with other than a licensed principal broker;
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any monies coming into his
possession that belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own. or diverting those
funds from the purpose for which they were received;
(7> paying or offering to pay valuable consideration, as defined by the commission, to any person
not licensed under this chapter, except that valuable consideration may be shared with a licensed
principal broker ofanother jurisdiction or as pro\ided under the Professional Corporation Act or
the Limited Liability Company Act;
(M being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent in
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such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public;
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies ofall documents to all parties executing the documents;
(10) failing to keep and make available for inspection by the division a record ofeach
transaction, including the names ofbuyers and sellers or lessees and lessors, the identification ol
the property, the sale or rental price, any monies received in trust, any agreements or instructions
from buyers and sellers or lessees and lessors, and any other information required by rule;
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the purchase, sale, or rental ofproperty, whether the
purchase, sale, or rental is made for himself or for an undisclosed principal;
(12) regardless ofwhether the crime was related to real estate, being convicted ofa criminal
offense involving moral turpitude within five years of the most recent application, including a
conviction based upon a plea of nolo contendere, or a plea held \n abeyance to a criminal offense
involving moral turpitude:
(13) advertising the availability ofreal estate or the services ofa licensee in a false, misleading,
or deceptive manner;
(14) in the case ofaprincipal broker or a licensee who is a branch manager, failing to exercise
reasonable supervision over the activities of his licensees and any unlicensed staff;
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission, or the rules adopted by
the commission and the division;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principal in a real estate transaction;
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing;
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or rule; or
(19) suspension, revocation, surrender, or cancellation ofa real estate license issued by another
jurisdiction, or ofanother professional license issued by this or another jurisdiction, based on
misconduct in a professional capacity that relates to character., honesty, integrity, or truthfulness.
1997
61-2-12 Disciplinary action - Judicial review.
(1) (a) Before imposing an educational requirement, a civil penalty, revoking, suspending,
placing on probation, or denying the renewal, reinstatement, or reissuance of any license or
certificate based on violation of Section 61-2-11 . the division shall give notice to the licensee or
certificate holder and schedule an adjudicaiive proceeding.
(b) If the licensee is an active sales agent or active associate broker, the division shall inform (he
principal broker with whom the licensee is affiliated of the charge and of the time and place of
the hearing.
(c) If after the hearing th3commission determines that any licensee or certificate holder is guilty
of a violation of this chapter, the license or certificate may be suspended, revoked, denied
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reissuance, or acivil penalty may be imposed by written order of the commission in concurrence
with the director.
(2) (a) -\nv applicant, certificate holder, licensee, or person aggrieved, including the
complainant, max' obtain judicial review or agency review by the executive director of any
adverse ruling, order, or decision of the director and the commission.
(b) If the applicant, certificate holder, or licensee prevails in the appeal and the court hnds that
the state action was undertaken without substantial justification, the court may award reasonable
litigation expenses to the applicant, certificate holder, or licensee as provided under 1itle .8.
Chapter 27a. Small Business Lqual Access to Justice Act.
(c) (i) -\n order, rule, or decision of the director and the commission shall take effect and become
operative 30 davs alter the service thereof unless otherwise provided in the order.
(n) If an appeal is taken by alicensee, the division may stay enforcement of the commission's
action in accordance with the provisions ofSection 63-466-18 .
(in) The appeal shall be governed by the l'tah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(3) "Lhe commission and the director shall comply with the procedures and requirements of Title
63, Chapter 46b. Administrative Procedures Act, in their adjudicative proceedings.
1 999
61-2-13 Grounds for revocation of principal broker's license - Automatic inactivation of
affiliated associate brokers and sales agents licenses.
,1) Anv unlawful act or anv violation of this chapter committed by any real estate sales agent or
associate broker employed'or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behall ol alicensed
principal broker or committed by any employee, officer, or member ot ahcensed principal
broker is cause for the revocation, suspension, or probation of the principal broker s license, or
for the imposition of afine against the principal broker ,n an amount not to exceed S>00 pei
violation.
P) The revocation or suspension of aprincipal broker license automatically inactivates every
associate broker or sales Lent license granted to those persons by reason of their all.hat.on with
the principal broker whose license was revoked or suspended, pending achange ot broker
,T, mtion Aprincipal broker shall, prior to the effective date of the suspension or revocation of
his license, notify in writing every licensee affiliated w.th him of the revocation or suspension ot
his license.
1991
61-2-13.5 Court-ordered discipline.
The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, or reinstate the use of alicense issued
under this chapter if so ordered by a court.
19ir
61-2-14 List of licensees to be available.
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The division shall make available at reasonable cost alist of the names and addresses of all
persons licensed by it under this chapter.
1983
61-2-17 Penalty for violation of chapter.
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addition to being subject to a license sanction or a
fine ordered by the commission, is, upon conviction ofa first v.olation, guilty ofaclass A
misdemeanor. Any imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed six months. If the violator is a
corporation, it is, upon conviction of a first vlolation, guilty of xclass Amisdemeanor.
(->) Upon conviction of asecond or subsequent violation, an individual is guilty of athird degree
felony. Imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed two years. If acorporation is convicted of
a second or subsequent violation, it is guilty of a third degree felony.
ion.(3) Any officer or agent of acorporation, or any member or agent of apartnership or associat
who personally participates in or is an accessory to any violation of this chapter by such
corporation, partnership, cr association, is subject to the penalties prescribed for individuals.
(4) If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as commission, compensation, or profit
by or in consequence of aviolation of this chapter, that person is liable for an additional penalty
ofnot less than the amount of the money received and not more than three times the amount of
money received, as may be determined by the court. This penalty may be sued for in any court of
competent jurisdiction, and recovered by any person aggrieved for his own use and benefit.
(5) All fines imposed by the commission and the director under this chapter shall,
notwithstanding Section 13-1-2 , be deposited into the Real Hstate Hducalion, Research, and
Recovery FunoMo be used in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Real Lstate
Recovery Fund Act.
1993
61-2-18 Actions for recovery of compensation restricted.
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in any court of this state for the recovery of a
commission, fee, or compensation for any act done or service rendered which is prohibited under
this chapter to other than licensed principal brokers, unless the person was duly licensed as a
principal broker at the time of the doing of the act or rendering the service.
(2) \'o sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the recovery of a fee,
commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or associate broker unless the action is
against the principal broker with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the recovery of a
fee, commission, or other compensation may only be instituted and brought by the principal
broker with whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated.
1985
61-2-20 Rights and privileges of real estate licensees.
Real estate licensees may fill out only those legal forms approved by the commission and the
attorney general, and those forms provided by statute, with the following exceptions:
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(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out any documents associated with the
closing of a real estate transaction.
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms prepared by legal counsel of the buyer,
seller, lessor, or lessee.
0) If the commission and the attorney general have not approved aspecific form for the
transaction principal brokers, associate brokers, and sales agents may fill out real estate torms
prepared by any legal counsel, including legal counsel retained by the brokerage to develop these
forms.
1993
61-2-21 Remedies and action for violations.
(1} (a) If the director has reason to believe that any person has been or is engaging in acts
constituting violations ofthis chapter, and ifit appears to the director that it would be mthe
public interest to stop such acts, he shall issue and serve upon the person an order directing that
person to cease and desist from those acts.
lb) Within ten days after receiving the order, the person upon whom the order is served may
request an adjudicative proceeding.
(c Pending the hearing the cease and desist order shall remain in effect.
(d) If arequest for ahearing is made, the division shall follow the procedures and requirements
of Title 63. Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(•>) (a) After the hearing, if the commission and the director agree that the acts of the person
violate this chapter, the director shall issue an order making the cease and desist order
permanent.
(b) If no hearing is requested and if the person fails to cease the acts, or after discontinuing foe
acts a^ain commences the acts, the director shall file suit in the name ofthe Department ot
Commerce and the Division of Real Lstate. in the district court in the county in which the acts
occurred or where the person resides or carries on business, to enjoin and restrain the person
from violating this chapter.
(e) The district courts ofthis state shall have jurisdiction of these suits.
C) The remedies and action provided in this section may not interfere with, or prevent the
prosecution of, any other remedies or actions including criminal proceedings.
1999
61-2-22 Separability.
If anv provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall not be affected thereby.
1985
61-2-24 Mishandling of trust funds.
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(1) The division may audit principal brokers' trust accounts or other accounts in which a licensee
maintains trust funds under this chapter. If the division's audit shows, in the opinion of the
division, i»ross mismanagement, commingling, or misuse of funds, the division, with the
concurrence of the commission, may order a complete audit of the account by a certified public
accountant at the licensee's expense, or take other action in accordance with Section 61-2-12 .
(2) The licensee may obtain agency review by the executive director orjudicial review of any
division order.
(3) If it appears that a person has grossly mismanaged, commingled, orotherwise misused trust
funds, the division, with or without prior administrative proceedings, may bring an action in the
district court of the district where the person resides or maintains a place of business, or where
the act or practice occurred or is about to occur, to enjoin the acts or practices and to enforce
compliance with this chapter or any rule ororder under this chapter. Upon a proper showing, the
court shall grant injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order, and may appoint a receiver or
conservator. The division is nol required to post a bond in any court proceeding.
1996
61-2-25 Sales agents - Affiliated with broker as independent contractors or employees -
Presumption.
A sales agent may be afffiated with a licensed principal real estate brokercither as an
independent contractor or as an employee. The relationship between sales agent and broker is
presumed to be an independent contractor relationship unless .here is clear and convincing
evidence that the relationship was intended by the parties to be an employer employee
relationship.
2003
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Exhibit B
Title 25. Fraud, Chapter 5. Statute of Frauds Pa^e 2 of 5
1953
25-5-4 Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
(3) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of
the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement:
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making of
the agreement;
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another:
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except
mutual promises to marry;
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the
liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own estate;
(c) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate
for compensation; and
(0 every credit agreement.
(2) (a) As used in Subsections (1 )(f) and this Subsection (2):
(i) (A) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by a financial institution to:
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or things in action;
(II) otherwise extend credit; or
(III) make any other financial accommodation.
(B) "Credit agreement" does not include the usual and customary agreements related to deposit
accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or extends a financial
accommodation under a credit agreement with a debtor.
(in) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means:
(A) a state or federally chartered:
(I) bank;
(II) savings and loan association;
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(III) savings bank;
(IV) industrial bank; or
(V) credit union; or
(B) any other institution under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial Institutions as
provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act.
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(e), a debtor or acreditor may not maintain an action
on a credit agreement unless the agreement:
(A) is in writing;
(B) expresses consideration;
(C) sets forth the relevant terms and conditions; and
(D) is signed by the party against whom enforcement ofthe agreement would be sought.
(n) For purposes of this act, a signed application constitutes a signed aureement, ifthe creditor
does not customarily obtain an additional signed agreement from the debtor when granting the
application.
(c) The following actions do not give rise to aclaim that a credit agreement is created, unless the
agreement satisfies the requirements of Subsection (2)(b):
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
(hi) the creation for any purpose between acreditor and adebtor of fiduciary or other business
relationships.
(d) Lach credit agreement shall contain aclearly stated typewritten or printed provision giving
notice to the debtor that the written agreement is a final expression ofthe agreement betweenlhe
creditor and debtor and the written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any
alleged oral agreement. The provision does not have to be on the promissory note or other
evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement.
(e) Acredit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature bv the party to be
charged if:
(i) the debtor is provided with awritten copy of the terms of the agreement;
Iii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall constitute acceptance of those
terms; and
(iii) after the debtor receives (he agreement, the debtor, or aperson authorized by die debtor
requests hinds pursuant tc the credit agreement or otherwise uses the credit offered.
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Exhibit C
Rule 56 Paee 1 of 1
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cress-claim or ;o obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or
after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or
any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a cla.m, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time move tor summary judgment as to all or any pad thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance vvith Rule
7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file. together with the affidavits, if any, shew that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a juegment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amour,: of damages.
(d'l Case net ful'y adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this 'ule judgment is not rendered upon the whole
case or for ali the relief asked and a trial is necessary the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleacmgs and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy and what materia! facts are actually and in good faith controverted,
't shall tnereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which tne amount of damages or ether relief is not in controversy, and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall oe deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively tnat the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified cop.es of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories or ''urther
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rue. an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or conials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall oe entered against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the aff davits of a party opposing the motion that the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the aff davits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the
o:her party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, inciud'ng
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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